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One of the main puzzles facing the analyst of the contemporary 
world is to explain why, as Harvey puts it, ~ m i g h t  it be that the 
elaboration of place-bound identities has become more rather 
than less important in a world of diminishing spatial barriers to 
exchange, movement and communication~, (Harvey, 1993:4). The 
unification of the European Community stands as an important 
example of the paradox identified by Harvey. On the one hand, 
the fifteen EU countries have almost completed the creation of a 
supranational space characterized by a unique market with 
interna1 free circulation of goods, services, capital, and people. 
Simultaneously, on the other hand, there is a strong revival of 
nationalist and localist ideologies, which are sometimes at the 
basis of the new racist movements against recent migrants and 
already established <<cultural minorities)). The construction of a 
new European transnational space involves a transformation of 
the ideological space around the new category of <<European 
citizenship,>, a blurry concept with no clear content. There are 
indeed multiple competing definitions today of what it means to 
be European. It may refer to a pan-European sentiment with a 
clear ethnic content -Europeans as peoples sharing a common 
history and culture-, orto a more limited idea, namely, the set of 
rights and duties of any European citizen. In any case, -Europe,> 
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is not by ariy means an established entity, but an ongoing project 
which involves complex ideological, social, and economic 
processes, for which there is not a clear outcome yet. 
The processes involved in the construction of the material 
and symbolic European space are even more complex if 
considered from the perspective of the Mediterranean European 
periphery, whose countries joined in the European project only 
ten years ago. Andalusia, like other southern European regions 
that joined the EC in the mid 80 S, has experienced a political and 
economic shift that is bringing about a redefinition of the symbolic 
spaces by which the notions of community and belonging are 
represented. My interest in this paper is to understand the 
ethnicization of social relations in this Spanish southern province 
as an exarnple of the way national and global transformations, 
such as the EU, interact with local idioms in the process of making 
sense of t:he new circumstances. I will analyze the Western 
Mediterrariean space and, specifically, the experience of North 
and Weste:.n Africans in Spain asan exampleof how new ethnicities 
are being produced in a dialectic relation between 1) the 
overpowerful role of the state in determining who is a citizen and 
2) the state's weakness in actually keeping control over thepeople 
living in tlie national territory, due to its transnational inter- 
dependenlcy and to massive transnational population movements. 
The redefinition of national and ethnic identities in Spain can 
only be uriderstood within the broader context of the Western 
Mediterranean imagined space, shaped by the opposing 
dynamics of rising borders and increasing borders crossing 
characteriistic of global interdependent capitalism. I will illustrate 
this procecs with reference to its effects at the local level, based 
on the fieldwork data collected since 1992 in the Andalusian 
province of Granada.' In order to grasp how new discourses and 
1. Finariciai support at various stages of fieldwork(l992-1995) was provided 
by the Natioral Science Foundation (SER-941 1667), the Fulbright/MEC doctoral 
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practices are conforming the current Spanish transition from an 
emigration to an immigration country, I collected material from 
official sources, made interviews to members of both governmental 
and non-governmental institutions, and to many immigrants 
working in the area (coming mostly from Morocco and Senegal), 
as well as extensive participant observation of the interaction 
between immigrants and the local population. I will show the 
complex, sometimes contradictory processes involved in the 
redefinition of Western Mediterranean borders, one of the crucial 
arenas in which European identity is forged. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the first section, 
I briefly discuss the geographical and historical scenario within 
which the current production of ethnic identities in Spain should 
be framed; the goal of this section is to prevent the reader against 
a too common essentialization of ethnic identities (Arab-Muslim 
vs European-Christian) and against stereotypes on North Africans 
and Andalusians, both peoples of the Mediterranean intensively 
anthropologized and romantiziced. In the second section I focus 
on the role of hegemonic discourses in the production of a new 
imagined community presented as culturally and socially incom- 
patible with thatof immigrants (Anderson, 1991 ; Hobsbawm 1990). 
Official governamental policy documents on immigration and the 
mass media are taken as representative of these hegemonic 
discourses. The third section deals with the main lines of the 
political economy of Mediterranean rebordering, such as migration 
law and labor market, emphasizing the way Aliens Law, with its 
strict difference between legal and immigrants, conju- 
grant, the Mellon Foundation, the Institutefor lnternational Studies at Stanford, and 
the Stanford Department of Anthropology. I am grateful to rny colleague Aida 
Hernandez, with whorn I shared three rnonths of fieldwork in 1992, for sharing with 
me her fieldwork rnaterials. I want to thank particularly the villagers of Alfaya and 
its African inhabitants, without whose generosity this research would have been 
impossible. 
2. 1 will use the terrn -illegal>. instead of more appropriated alternatives 
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res up new inner borders in precarious economic sectors already 
shaped by another kind of illegal practices, the informal economy 
which pervisdes peripheral European countries. The fourth and 
main sectic~n illustrates the daily processes by which people in 
rural Andalusia make sense of the new axes along which social 
identity ancl difference are being constructed: citizenship and 
ethnicity. I will show how ethnic and legal inner borders become 
dominant rnediums through which relations of inequality are 
structured, in a complex panorama shaped by class identity and 
geographic.al competition among regions in the new global order. 
The concluding section provides a counterpoint to hegemonic 
discourses by describing some of the alternative discourses and 
practices that resist dominant discourse by problematizing states 
definition o': citizenship and its invisible ethnic content, and the 
way they incorporate a new European frame which draws from 
Andalusian recent experiences and imaginaries as peoples of 
the South . 
The scenario: western mediterranean's moving borders 
My approa~sh to ethnic conflict in Andalusia is informed by a 
reconsideration of the spatial framework of reference in the recent 
literature ori migration and ethnic relations in Spain. Although I 
acknowledge that any territorial boundaries are somewhat artifi- 
cial, my delimitation of <cWestern Mediterranean,, asan integrated 
area of study for the analysis of ethnic conflict has two main 
purposes. (3n the one hand, I want to emphasize the historical 
connection and mutual influences between peoples in both shores: 
the Mediterranean, rather than a barrier, has always been abrid- 
(undocumented or irregular) because I want to keep the connotations of the word 
and reflect its widespread use by almost everybody in daily discourses (from 
official sources, to mass media, to immigrants discourses). 
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ge.3 On the other hand, I want to avoid the strong tendency to reify 
the concept of <<Europe,, as a constituted, non-problematic cul- 
tural entity; instead, I will consider <<Europe>> as a dominant ideal 
image, which participates in an historical project which does not 
yet have a pre-established outcome (Balibar, 1991). 
Since the first part of the century, the immigrants in Europe 
came from the Mediterranean: Moroccans, Algerians, Spaniards, 
Portuguese, I t a l i an~ .~  Until recently, Spain shared with North Afri- 
ca in sending laborers as part of the guest-workers programs in 
northern Europe. As a Spanish association abroad put it, there 
has been a common <<culture of emigration,, to richer areas, built 
in the context of geopolitical and economic dependence and 
defined in relation to specific political and administrative 
tradit i~ns.~Only a couple of decades ago the Spanish government 
3. Braudel(1972) was one of thefirst historians that chose the Mediterranean 
asan ecological unit in which exchanges and influences shaped acornrnon history. 
Frorn Anthropology, several efforts have been rnade to present the area as a 
coherent whole; Davis (1 977) is one of the authors that better tried to rnake sense 
of this unified Mediterranean construct. Braudel's and Davis's unitary vision of the 
Mediterranean has been challenged by other scholars who argue that Christian 
and lslamic societies far from being mutually constituted, have becorne 
irreconcilable enernies since the 16th century. 
4. Most of the literature on migration in Europe, draws a clear limit between 
Northern developed Europe and the Mediterranean. See for exarnple the already 
classics Berger & Mohr, 1975 and Castles & Kosack, 1973. More than 1,200,000 
Spaniards participated in the ~~guestworker~ p ograms in France, Gerrnany, or 
Switzerland, a figure which does not take into account clandestine emigration. 
Andalusia isthe region with a higher representation in European countries, specially 
people from rural background. From 1973 to the rniddle 80's rnost ernigrants 
progressively return to Spain, although there are still important collectivesabroad 
(Cazorla, 1989). 
5. 1 found the expression culture of rnigration to refer to Spanish ernigrants' 
specific culture in a manuscript titled .Primeras Jornadas de Educación y Cultu- 
ra-, by the Association of Spanish lrnmigrants in Holland. The description of 
cornmon beliefs and values in this and other Spanish ernigrants' testimonies is 
similar to that of peoples rnigrating from other peripheral areas, such as the 
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favored emigration both through discourses and institutional 
support. In (addition to the creation of the lnstitute of Emigration, 
there was a pro-emigration discourse which lasted until the mid- 
seventies: << emigration is a field of open possibilities for the free 
individual and, at the same time, a strong source of links and 
relations to other peoples, which can be beneficia1 at the socio- 
economic It?vel.. .not only for the family who emigrates but for both 
theircountrj/of origin and the receiving country,, (1 960 Emigration 
Law, in López del Amo, 1990). There is plenty of evidence however, 
that shows Iiow both Moroccans and Spaniards -many of them 
Andalusians- who emigrated to northern European countries 
during the 60's and 701s, resented their stigmatization in the guest 
countries a!; poor, ignorant and <<different,> so~therners.~ 
This very recent common identity as emigrants, and as 
discriminated outsiders proved to be a major factor in the 
constructioii of identities in the Andalusian village of Alfaya where 
I was working, shaping the relationship between Spanish ex- 
emigrants who returned from <<Europe>), and the Moroccan 
emigrants who today work in this Spanish village, now part of an 
extended Europe. Almost half of Alfaya villagers left Andalusia to 
work in France, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, countries that 
were considered European in contrast to Spain; even today is 
only common among villagers to consider the so-called Moors as 
culturally closer to them than Northern Europeans .' The Euro- 
- 
Caribbean, described by Rubenstein as czmigration ideology. (quoted in Blash et 
al, 1994: 63). 1 use the expression with reticence however: it should not be 
understood as a metiphysical and essential entity but as a cultural expression of 
the country's location in the international labor market and the discourses and 
practices of the state. 
6. SeeC. Colé, 1982, Castles & Kosack, 1985, Wilpert, 1988, for testimonies 
on Spanish arid other Mediterranean workers in Northern Europe. 
7. -Moros- is the common term used to refer to North Africans in daily life, 
and its use cornesfrom several centuries ago. Many times it is used as a derogatory 
term, but not always, although it cleariy draws its meaning from a biased and 
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pean frontier before 1986 was drawn in the Pyrenees, where 
French border controls scrutinized Spanish and Moroccan workers 
alike as immigrants from the <<South>, . Andalusian identity was 
symbolically opposed to Europe's identity and to that of other rich 
regions of Spain such as Catalonia.* Thus, the border between 
the North and the South was also drawn within the Spanish territory. 
As J. Berger puts it in its already classic book The Seventh Man, 
( 1  975) (< At one point he (sic) crossed the frontier. This mayor may 
not have coincided with the geographical frontier of his country. 
It isn't the geographical frontier what counts: the frontier is simply 
where he is able to be stoppedand his intention to leave thwarted. ,, 
Andalusians think of themselves as peoplefrom the ((South,,, 
imagined as a backward social, economic, and political area 
where exploitation and poverty reached almost everybody in the 
past and still is in a disadvantage situation in relation to other 
areas of Spain and, of course, of Europe. Knowing this, Rashib, 
essentialized notion of North Africans historically forged in the close relations 
between peoples in both shores. 
Andalusians and North Africans continuously refer to common traditions and 
to ideas they share, and contrast them to their perception of North European 
culture; daily interactions underscore the importance of f~honesty and wariness in 
interpersonal relations. (vs. hypocrisy and coldness in Northern Europe), 
-community life and solidarity>> (vs. isolation), and many other purportedly 
Mediterranean cultural characteristics. It should be noted, however, that their 
ethnic representationsarealso shaped by mutual historical imagesof conflict and 
intolerance, suchas Arab's presence in Al-Andalusandother peninsular kingdoms 
for seven centuries, Spanish protectorate in Morocco, Moroccans participation in 
the Spanish Civil war as part of Franco's elite army, and the weight of (unequal) 
commercial trade between the two nations. 
8. By 1979, 1,309,000Andalusianswereworking in northern Spanish regions 
which drawon immigrant populationfor industrial development. ln the lateseventies, 
more than 40% of the Catalonian population did not identify with the Catalonian 
nation nor did they spoke their language (Solé, 1982: 21 .) Most of them camefrom 
the south of Spain, and specifically Andalusia; in contrasttoemigration to European 
countries most have stayed and nowadays constitute a socio-cultural minority 
which is especially salient in Catalonia. 
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a Moroccan worker in Alfaya, referred to the common emigration 
to the <<former>> Europe of both Spanish and Moroccan people as 
highly contrasting with today's relation between the two peoples: 
cc When 1 was working in France with my sister, our neighbor was 
from Almería [Granada's neighbor province, one of the seven 
which make up the region ofAndalusia]. Actually, rnost people in 
that French district are from Spanish or Moroccan background, 
and they al1 live together, because they are al1 the same. This 
family frorn Almería is actually very close to my family over 
there.. . Here, it is so different; people that were starving just one 
decade agc) are now rejecting us, because we are moros (moors). 
Who can understand this?,) 
Probably, the answer to his question is that the Mediterranean 
social spacme and the identities of its people are being reshaped 
by new moving borders. Moreover, Andalusia is not an homo- 
geneous space, but one in which different, sometimes conflicting 
cultural and economic traditions coexist. The new <(European 
identity,, (arid citizenship) can be perceived as a reward to Spa- 
nish successful economic growth and political transition, but at 
the same time as an artificial entity which disempowers people's 
cultures and autonomy. Andalusians see new immigrants as si- 
milar to thernselves, in that many of them also had to cross borders 
in order to survive, but also as disruptive enemies, cheap labor 
which threatens the weak economic stability in the region. As it 
always did, the Mediterranean acts as afluid, flexible and moving 
line of encounters and clashes. 
The makingl of an european spain and of southern immigrants 
Spain has experienced a progressive economic growthg and a 
9. After the parenthesisof autarchic policies of thefirst period of the Francoist 
dictatorship, Spain progressively aligned itself with western developed countries, 
first through the military and economic pact with the United States (1953); 
preferential ccrnrnercial agreements with the EC (late sixties): the death of the 
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transition to a democratic regime through the past decades, that 
have consolidated political and socio-economic rightsfor Spanish 
citizens. Spain was until very recently a country of emigrants, but 
it now has become an immigration country. Both stages have 
responded to the needs of global capitalism for a mobile labor 
force, to favor accumulation and profit, but Spain's location in the 
international division of the labor market has been dramatically 
transformed. As a consequence, new alignments of national and 
supra-national borders have emerged in the northern margin of 
the sea, through Andalusiaand the Levant of the I berian peninsula, 
marking the new limits of both Spain and Europe, and of course, 
of the first world. The positioning of the border is legitimized in 
dominant discourses in terms of socio-cultural, political and 
economic homogeneity with Europe, as well as raciallethnic unity 
defined in symbolical opposition to that of the <(other,,. 
This homogeneity is being constructed through nationalistic 
discourses appealing to a purportedly national common interest 
in the rebordering of the Mediterranean.1° The document (<Basic 
Lines of the Spanish Migration Policy,, is exemplary of Spanish 
government discourse on ~ t h e  problem of immigration». Here 
the government claims that ((National interest as well as the 
imposed obligations denved from our membership in the EEC, 
require us to take measures to articulate a rigorous control at the 
[southern] border,, (Spanish Government, 1990: 16). The reason 
why national interest <(forces us,, to reject a very specific group 
dictator (1975) and afterwards with its incorporation to NATO (1982) and to the 
European Community (1986). The US-Spain agreement set the basis of the 
phenomenon that has been called the -Spanish economic miracle>. which produced 
an accelerated economic development during the 60 S (see Colectivo IOE, 1987). 
10. Even though the description of the problematic status of a common 
Spanish national identity is beyond the scope of this paper, readers should take 
into account the political and cultural force of various national identities within the 
Spanish territory, which are officially recognized by the 1978 Spanish Constitution. 
The common interest referred to in the text appears to be above the many conflicts 
of interests arising from this plurinational nature of the state. 
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of ~unwantc?d,, immigrantsfrom the southern Mediterranean shore, 
is phrased in this document in cultural and ethnic terms: 
~ S p a n ~ s h  migration policyhas to be an active one. This means 
to direct immigration according to the interest of the state, taking 
intoaccourrttheorigin, temporality, professionalprofile, integration 
ability ...[m ~grants from] Less developed countries often produce 
many integiration problems, because they come from countries 
with very different social habits.,, (my emphasis; Spanish Go- 
vernment, 1990, Section on Social lntegration : 18) 
Dominant discourse plays a major part in the construction of 
a space ir1 which ethnic difference is seen as disruptive and 
threatening. The Spanish inclusion in the group of developed 
capitalist countries is creating both symbolic andmaterialborders 
with a thirtj world characterized in the dominant discourse by 
accused economic inequalities, high levels of poverty and 
unstable political situations, which allegedly <<promote>, extremist 
social behavior. This characterization of southern immigrants 
allows doniinant discourse to take afurther step in the creation of 
an alarmist image of the security of Spanish society, by the es- 
sential link.age between illegal immigrants and the increase of 
violence within the national borders. The government and other 
politicians in Spain use crime statistics to further enforce the 
legitimizat~lon of the state's use of force: (<given the marginality 
and illegality of clandestine immigration, an increase of delin- 
quency has been proven>, (Spanish Government: 1990, Section 
on Strengthening Police Action : 19.)11 
A final 'threatening' characteristic of the people from the 
southern shore is a demographic one. Here we have the idea of 
- 
11. Plaiias Cercós, Chief Administrative Officer at he Civil Government of 
Barcelona: (1990) says that already 20% of criminal acts were performed by 
foreigners in 1988. It is unclear whether these statistics count illegal residence in 
Spain as -dcilinquent~, in which case such increase would be hardly surprising 
(see Hall et 141, 1978 for a critica1 analysis of the use of crime statistics in Great 
Britain). 
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an old Europe -or better, of old white Europeans-, unable to 
control the growth of underdeveloped countries. A high official of 
the Civil Government in Barcelona says that <<in the next20years 
around 25 million of emigrants from North Africa will unquestio- 
nably try to find jobs in Europe,, (Planas Cercós, 1990). Again an 
alarmist tone is used to stir up old fears of a silent invasion of the 
lberian Peninsula. 
Similarly, in our analysis of the newspaper El País (Suárez 
Navaz, & Hernández, 1993), we detected a consistent propensity 
to represent immigrants as a <<problem>>, because of both their 
illegality, their poverty and their purported criminality. The reader 
is invited to articulate herlhis own identity as opposed to that of 
the immigrant; by way of symbolic inversion. -Spaniards thus 
would become those who legally live and work in Spain, those 
who have access to public benefits, those who have houses and 
who are controllable. The press takes for granted that the <<nor- 
mal,, and [(rational,, behavior for Spanish citizens is to safeguard 
their personal and <<national,, interests, which are represented in 
opposition to those of immigrants. The objective of this discourse 
of <<normalization,, is to make sense of the dominant perception 
that immigrants are an obstacle to regular development of social 
and economic relations. Many times, thus, <<irrational,, reactions, 
such as racism and xenophobia, are explained as a necessary, 
though unfortunate, outcome of Spanish evolution. 
Thus, immigration is <<naturalized,, through concepts that 
equate movements of population with ethnically and economically 
limited groups and that represent these 'groups' as a threat to 
Spain's well-being and security. As a correlate, ethnic con- 
frontation is perceived as an illness or <<cancer>> of society. Inte- 
restingly enough, the state, which is in part responsible for 
enforcing an ethnicization of Spanish society through its discourse 
and practices, receives additional legitimization by purporting to 
provide -remedy,, for this <<disease,,, namely, a modern and 
efficient legislative apparatus. Let's see now some crucial 
transformations at the legal and socioeconomic level which inform 
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the constrilction of new ethnicities before we deal with the 
contradictory way this is perceived and acted upon at the local 
level. 
Legal and :~ocioeconomic panorama 
The redefinition of the Spanish border and identity has been 
accompanied by a change in Spain's location in the international 
labor markcit and by the enactment in 1985 of the first complete 
and cohereint legislation on foreigners status in Spain, the new 
Aliens Law (Ley Orgánica de Extranjería, LOE).12 The law was 
enacted through the urgent parliamentary procedure in order to 
remedy the legislative chaos produced by the heterogeneity and 
dispersion of norms related to the foreign population in Spain, 
and to restrict the entry of Third World immigrants who were 
traditionally welcomed in Spain, especially from North Africa and 
Latin America (Corredera & Díez, 1994: 126). The creation of a 
secure southern European frontier through the LOE can be 
considered as a precondition for Spain's incorporation in 1986 
into a European space without inner frontiers, even though this 
reason is not clearly phrased in the Parliamentary d i scus~ ions .~~  
12. Popularly knownas the Ley de Extranjería, thespanish migration policy 
consist in the C)rganic Law 711985 lstof July, on Rightsand Libertiesof Foreigners 
in Spain, and the Royal decree of 1986. Additional legislation includes European 
Council's and lnternational agreements. See Ley y Reglamento de Extranjería, 
1991. 
13. Froin 1985 European migratory policies are developed in several 
intergovernmental arenas: the Group of Schengen, the [(Ad Hoc* group of 
immigration, and the group of TREVI. The European Parliament has several times 
denounced the agreements for their extra-communitary character and for the 
secrecy of their resolutions. One of the main consequences is that security and 
administrative practices are not subject to a supranational control, nor to national 
parliamentary and juridical control. For a good description of the process by which 
the inter-governmental groups created the current migration policies see the 1990 
Report of Hurrian Rights in Spain, APDHE, 1991. 
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Instead, the emphasis of the parliamentary discussion was made 
on the intolerable situations produced by the absence of coherent 
legislation of foreign population (Records of parliamentary 
discussions, in Corredera & Díez, 1994: 134). This alarmist tone 
does not conform with the little attention paid by public opinion 
and state forces to the African and Latin American immigrants 
who were progressively settling in Spain, as I will show later in the 
study case of Granada (for the first good overview on immigration 
in Spain, see Colectivo IOE 1987). It is not until the first years of 
the 90s when both mass media, experts and politicians bring 
immigrants to the show windows, specially after the consolidation 
of the Straits of Gibraltar as a new Río Bravo, where immigrants 
almost daily risked their lives to enter Europe. 
Spanish legal frame towards immigration is hereditary of 
northern European post-fordist political and legal restrictions to 
assisted immigration, dating from the mid-70s, and it should be 
framed in the process of construction of a common European 
space able to compete in the new global economy. In addition to 
the closing of frontiers, European nation-states developed a myriad 
of administrative regulations to curtail full membership of the 
already established minorities, creating a growing population 
with limited rights. The LOE reproduces this model of citizenship 
which creates a hierarchy of legal statutes within the European 
frontiers, from the full citizen who holds full social and political 
rights, to the intermediary status of denizens which excludes 
aliens from full membership, to the exclusionary category of 
((illegals,, (Hammer, 1985). Specially important to our interest 
here is its (<administrative character,,: security forces and the 
administration are in charge of establishing the conditions for 
entry, stay, work, and departure of foreigners with only an a 
posterioriand partial intervention of the Courts. A lawyer working 
very close with undocumented workers describes the 
consequences of the administrative character of the law as follows: 
(<those immigrants do not have in Spain a single right. The law 
anticipates any circumstance. Basically, the message is that if 
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you are "illc?gal", the state has only one responsibility: to deport 
you, without any chance to appeal in court such action,) l" ( E .  M . ,  
lawyer for tlie Human Rights Association in Granada, APDH.) 
The LCIE makes a strong distinction between legal and 
<qillegal,, foreigners, equating the latter with delinquents. Even 
though the stated objective of the state is ~ ( t o  protect the legal 
rights and juridical guarantees of the legal foreigner in Spain,, , 
the law has not been a success in providing a minimum legal 
coverture tc) most Third World immigrants. The main reason is the 
link established by the law between the staylwork permits and the 
needs of the national labor market, as well as discriminatory 
practices iri granting visas to people coming from Third World 
co~n t r i es . ' ~  Given the fact that most third world immigrants had 
either crossed illegally the southern frontier or stayed in the country 
- 
14. Several articles of the LOE were afterwards declared as unconstitutional, 
such as Art. 34 to which this lawyer was referring to, as well as art. 7 and 8, on the 
prohibition of association of .illegal>. workers and 26, on detention and expulcion 
procedures. In fact, still today the irnmigrant who wants to appeal an order of 
deportation can do so, but this will not stop deportation. In practice rnost Third 
World immigrants are left at the mercy of non-consistent, many times arbitrary 
decisions of aijministrative actors, such as their wish to write a deportation order 
or accept a documert as valid. 
15. Art. 12 of the LOE/85 states that: <<para la concesión de la visa se aten- 
derá al interés del estado Españoly de sus nacionales. La denegación no nece- 
sitará ser motivada>.(-in granting a visa, the interests of the Spanish state and its 
nationals s h s ~ l d  be taken into account. The refusal to grant the visa needs not be 
motivated>.). Equally important, visaapplicants have to prove that they can support 
themselves during their stay in Spain. Around $500 are required, plus $5 for each 
day of stay, arid the return ticket. Poor people from the third world find it difficult 
to justify this rrloney, a ~ d  many times they just prefer to cross the border illegally: 
which appears like more accessible alternative. The coordinator of the NGO 
-Algeciras Ac3ge.> tcld us that -nobody would risk his/her life crossing the Straits 
of Gibraltar in such horrible conditions if they could come with a temporal visa>>. 
NGOs in Andcilusia blame the state for the continuous deaths in the Straits, with 
demonstratioris during 1991 and 1992 in front of the Civil Government with the 
slogan .<No more deaths in the Straits; For a solidary Mediterranean).. 
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once their visas were expired, most third world immigrant were 
categorized as illegal population. The available estimateson illegal 
immigrants before 1990 ranged between 172.000 and 366.500, 
most of them belonging to poor countries.16Aware of this situation, 
the government offered an amnesty program in 1991 regularizing 
the situation of 108.000 undocumented foreigners coming from 
Africa (almost 60.000), Latin America (29.000), and Asia (9.000).17 
Even though this program was a relative success, undocumented 
status is still pervasive among Third World immigrants, given the 
strict conditions established by the LOE to renew the temporary 
staylwork permits, which requires a legal contract, the payment 
of the required taxes by both employer and employee, and the 
lack of unemployment among nationals in the sector in which the 
immigrant is working. As a consequence of this, the government 
has offered again an amnesty program in the spring of 1996 
which is currently in progress and it is thought to affect 70.000 
third world immigrants. 
The distinction between legal and illegal immigrants, defined 
by the law pervades daily life as well as institutional programs for 
immigrants' integration. The strict division along legal criteria is 
not as clear in practice as it is in theory, given the slowness and 
inefficacy of Spanish administration in solving pending cases 
and the contradictions among different state offices involved in 
the processes. An ethnographic approach to the immigrant 
16. Three were the rnost cornmon statistical analysis of undocurnented 
workers in Spain, al1 of thern made before the 1991 regularization: 
-Colectivo IOE (1987): 366.500 
-A.lzquierdo (1989): Low Hypothesis: 81.0001Mediurn H.: 125.000lHigh 
H.:220-240.000. 
-PASS (1989): 172.000 (confirmed), 259.000 (estimated) 
17. The nurnber of legal immigrants from Africa has increased to 14,81% of 
legal foreign population; however, it is irnportant to keep in rnind that more than 
half of the legal imrnigrants in Spain cornefrom Europe (56,25%.). See Ministerio 
de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, 1992. 
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population prevents one from falling into the false dichotomy 
created by ithe Alien Law: there are not just legal and illegal aliens, 
but a myriad of legal situations in the middle of these two extre- 
mes.18 The integration in the informal economy with its potential 
for discrimination, does not apply only to illegal immigrants. Even 
those who were able to obtain a work permit are often illegally 
hired; more importantly, the work permits that are granted are 
mostly in sectors of the economy such as services and agricul- 
ture with high incidence of non-registered participation. Besi- 
des, because the work permits are temporary, many of them con- 
tinue their activities in these sectors until the renewal is granted 
-which many times takes one more year-, now as illegal 
workers.lg 111 Granada, for instante, almost half of the Senegalese 
community is <<¡Ilegal,, or is waiting the institutions response to 
their application for stay and work permit (Suárez Navaz, 1995). 
The most important reason for the high incidence of 
undocumented status among Third World immigrants is their 
location in the already polarized social structure and the 
precariousness of a very important sector of Spanish population. 
The informal economy has not been created nor dramatically 
increased by immigrants; a study ordered by the government in 
- 
18. The law establishes multiple formal requirements to legally stay in the 
country, which should be renewed every year in most cases. In practice many 
 legal^ immigrants are in the process of getting ready to present their application 
to renew the residence and job permit, waiting for the answer from the authorities 
(many times arriving months later) whilecontinuing working, working in an economic 
sector other than that approved by the Ministry of Labor, or having moved from the 
one assigned in their residence without notifying it to the police ... Any of these 
situations are defined by the law as illegal, and can be punished with expulsion 
from tne country. 
19. The renewal of the work permit is not, as I said, automatic. It depends on 
the <<interests of the state.. Many immigrants who had acquired a legal status 
become illegal again when the initial work permit expires, because they failed to 
pay the taxes, or dueto the reticence of employers to hire people who can bring 
attention to thoir underground economic practices. 
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1985 estimated that 1 out of 4 active Spaniards worked in the 
informal economy (see Benton, 1990: Ch. 7.) Immigrants, then, 
are just joining this structural tendency. In addition, Spain has the 
highest rate of unemployment of Europe, rate that increases in 
specific economic sectors and regions such as Andalusia where 
up to 34% of the active population is unemployed or underem- 
ployed in the underground economy. However, the differentiation 
between legal\ illegal status in relation to citizenship rights is 
having important consequences in drawing ethnic lines between 
migrants and native population. An interview I had with a director 
of a long-time established urban informal enterprise illustrates a 
common justification for discriminatory hiring policies: <<I do not 
hire any foreigner, and it is not that I am racist, just realistic. You 
see, we move many millions [of pesetas] every month here, and 
they show up nowhere; the administration would be happy to get 
al1 the taxes from our work, and a foreigner is more likely to 
denounce it if caught by the police [this person is assuming here 
that is more likely for a colored person to be arrested, and then 
forced to give information about hislher employer]. Besides, they 
are too unstable ..., I cannot afford people leaving without returning 
the merchandise. Spanish people generally have an address 
where you can ask for the person. If you want to find immigrants, 
you can just go to x; they really exploit these people to the fullest. 
We do not do that, and our staff is more permanent (3-4 months 
to years.),, 
Thefact is that Third World immigrants, either legal or ~ ~ i l l e g a l ~ ~ ,  
become a source of suspicion; the police stops them frequently 
for ident i f i~at ion,~~ and thus they are seen by national workers 
20. 1 confirrned this during rny fieldwork since I was stopped rnuch more 
frequently when I was with African irnmigrants, either in the car or just walking 
around in the street or in the village. Even though I arn Spanish, thefact that I was 
born'in Colombia, inforrnation which is included in thespanish National Document 
of Identity (DNI), showed to be an additional sourceof suspicion. African irnmigrants 
use to joke about this, saying that it was good to be stopped with me because the 
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involved in the informal economy as a potential threat for their 
security or tlieir profit. This ethnic discrimination can be specially 
acute in reg~ions andlor economic sectors with a high incidence 
of informal practices, as it is the case of rural Andalusia. In Alfaya 
the illegality of many day laborers during harvest time, when they 
are most needed, is considered one of the principal problems by 
local authorities, who have complained against the way the LOE 
is sometimes applied in the village, as we will see bellow. The 
ethnic and legal borders conjured up by the Alien Law should not 
be taken for granted in asociety highly pervaded by black money, 
economic vulnerability, and a high degree of informality towards 
the state. People involved in the informal economy cannot legally 
hire workers, and they prefer highly dependent and manageable 
people, wholare not so interested in the social benefits guaranteed 
by labor legislation. Undocumented workers accept these jobs 
without asking for contracts, minimum salaries or health care 
benefits. The presence of Third World immigrants is thus used by 
the state to indirectly control autochthonous informal behaviors in 
highly vulnerable economic sectors, in such a way that peasants 
and employers involved in informal economy have become during 
these years the most efficient agents of Alien Law. 
In fact the effect of the law in the restructuring of collective 
identities and social spaces is based not only in the explicit 
regulatory and punitive action of the law, but also and most 
importantly in the disciplinary techniques and self-regulation 
processes that this distinction between legality and illegality is 
producing in civil society, as I showed elsewhere (Suárez Navaz 
1996a). Thus, the symbolic as well as the regulative action of the 
LOE is creating internalbordersamong the people living in Spain, 
based on a restrictednotion ofcitizenshipwhich indirectly requires 
potential citizens to have a high economic level. The group of 
stereotype of Colornbians being drug dealers attenuated the attention paid to 
them. 
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immigrants that do not have the ideal level and origin are 
condemned to join the ranks of the informal economy and to 
permanent persecution by the police or by other social actors 
who see their invisibility threatened by immigrants presence. 
New citizenships, new ethnicities: 
The state, the illegals and the informals in the european periphery 
The rebordering of the Mediterranean should be analyzed in the 
context of major global socio-economic transformations, such as 
the progressive unification of the EC and the changing role of 
nation-states in an interdependent economy. The effect of these 
transformations in daily life and local notions of imagined 
communities is a slow and complex process which should be 
explored through the many different social locations in which the 
categories [of inclusion and of exclusion] are actually used and 
struggled over (Malkki, 1992: 9). The case of the village of Alfaya 
enables meto question essentialist notions of social and cultural 
identity implicitly held in many studies of immigration situated in 
core European countries. Andalusian peasants have been 
traditionally situated at the margins of society to the extreme that 
they have felt as foreigners in their land , and that they have been 
treated as persons only after having abandoned their villages 
(Burgos, 1972: 37, 94). In the making of a modern , European 
style state and society, Spanish government's legitimacy depends 
on its ability to guarantee social rights and to provide equal 
opportunities to al1 its citizens, including those from poor regions 
such as Andalusia and marginal economic sectors such as 
agriculture. The new category citizen in Spain should not be left 
unquestioned; instead, we should investigate the process by which 
it is given sense at the local level. Similarly, the content and use 
of ethnic and cultural categories should be understood in the 
context of the shifting national and supranational frontiers in the 
western Mediterranean and Europe. 
As discussed above, Alfaya's villagers like those of many 
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other Andalusian villages, experienced a forced emigration in the 
sixties and seventies to France, Germany, or Switzerland, were 
they worked together with Moroccan and other Mediterranean 
peoples. Today, new irrigation projects spurred by Spain's 
insertion to the EC have brought them back home and Moroccan 
and into Alfaya to work for them. The economic miracle of Alfaya 
is perceived at the local level as a result of their own efforts, a 
consequence of peasants innovating techniques, getting the most 
from the niicroclimate which favors intensive horticultural 
production in a very competitive situation. Similarly, the 
permanence of the Communist Party in local government since 
the first dernocratic municipal elections in 1979 is reported by 
many as a grass-root movement which incorporated the interests 
and needs of al1 villagers, most of whom were formerly margi- 
nalized froni decision making institutions as ignorant peasants. 
The arrival of African immigrants in the 90s, despite their small 
number, hais produced in the village a disproportionate concern 
and public attention. The reason for this is that African immigrants 
have been the revulsive through which peasants are redefining 
their location in the Spanish social structure, their notion of 
belonging to an imagined community, and their ideological 
principles about people's rights and status, along new criteria of 
European citizenship and ethnicity or culture. In this section I 
illustrate solme of the ways in which this process is taking place 
by analyzing the effects of this transformation in both villagers 
and immigrants, focusing on the struggle to define local belonging 
and exclusion. 
The firsit African immigrants who arrive to the village found it 
easy to connect with villagers, as one of them told me: People in 
Alfaya were very open then (1987), the first day I arrive I met R., 
E.L., P., ...[ several people from the village], they invited me to a 
drink and I told them about my country and they told me about the 
tomatoes arid lettuces and the political struggle of the village to 
keep intermediaries out. I spend three days here selling my stuff 
in the market and they told me there was plenty of work here. I 
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decided to try because I liked the village from the beginning. I 
stayed under the chestnut tree, but after a couple of days E. 
offered me a place to sleep through the father of P. Everybody 
was very good here, very common people, al1 of them Commu- 
nist ... (Assane D. interview summer 1994). Assane got introduced 
in a group of young people, had a girlfriend, and lived with a 
couple of families. Afterwards he participated in a cooperative 
movement promoted by a group of young villagers, and felt really 
integrated in the village's networks. He describes the experience 
in the following terms: <<We had this project, it was a commune, 
where al1 of us participated equally, we cultivated tomatoes and 
lettuces, and then we had a lot of meetings and we also had fun. 
They used to say that everything was going to change ... [one of 
the members] told us about what was going on in Nicaragua, and 
also about the need to unite us al1 in order to achieve a just 
society.>> 
It was 1989 and Assane had lived openly in Alfaya and the 
neighbor village where the cooperative was set for almost two 
years; there was no inquiries nor pressure from police despite the 
fact that he did not have any permit to stay and work in Spain. 
During this time, he was learning a new way to talk about justice 
and rights which was previously unknown to him, a new discourse 
which served him better to communicate with allies and to resist 
to marginalization in Europe. By the end of that year, however, he 
was stopped by the police and required to identify. Villagers 
began to know about foreigners <cillegality>> through his case. 
Resistance to this categorization was strong from the beginning: 
The Civil Guard told me that I did not have a proper visa to stay 
and that I had to go with him to Granada so I couldn't escape. You 
are going to sleep in jail, boy, -he told me-, because you are 
illegal. That really annoyed me ... then I told him, I am legal, because 
I haven't stolen anything, I haven't killed anybody, I haven't done 
anything wrong, I'm just working in an honest way. I am nota drug 
dealer, I work in the land, with tomatoes and lettuces . . .  l am legal. 
An illegal can be Spanish or black, it S somebody who has done 
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something wrong. I am black, but I am legal (interview, summer
1994). Almost everybody in the village supported him, but a group
of people from the commune worked specially hard for his case:
there were hunger strikes, demonstrations, TV and radio
interviews. Due to the imminent expulsion, the village council
assembled the councilors in an meeting where they named Assane
as «adoptive son» of the village, thus symbolically circumventing
requirements for legal residence. The case was well known in
Andalusia and Spain. People who managed this case asked for
a work/stay permit «because he is just struggling, together with
other people, to get a job», and «because justice is a right for all
citizens of the world» (original pasquinade distributed in the
demonstrations, 1989)
This case was finally won. Assane was granted his permit
and continued working in Alfaya and Granada sometimes in the
countryside, other times as street seller. After the first year the
permit expired, but he managed to stay in the country either as
a legal worker, when he was lucky to get a contract, or as an
illegal foreigner, always careful of eluding the police. Slowly more
and more Africans came to the village, most of them in the same
situation as Assane, at the border of legality. Many came right
after crossing the Gibraltar strait, the 14 kilometers of water which
divide Spain from Morocco. Soon there were more than one
hundred Moroccan and Senegalese immigrants sleeping under
the chestnut trees or in abandoned farms or cars, and working as
dayworkers for peasants families who were not able to pick the
all tomatoes on their own. During the summer campaign, the
2000 inhabitants of Alfaya tripled, most immigrants coming from
the depressed rural areas of the surrounding villages and only a
hundred African immigrants. There was plenty of work for
everybody, and villagers were happy to have an extra source of
workers at the climax of the campaign.
African workers were initially perceived to be at the same
class position as other Andalusian dayworkers coming from the
vicinity. They worked together in the same crew and most of them
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received the same salary. The situation resembled that of other 
Andalusian villages to which Alfaya's peasants emigrated on a 
temporary basis from the 50s to the 70s, and that experience fed 
the way Alfaya's peasants acted in the present. At that time, 
dayworkers from the vicinity where given priority to others coming 
from places like Alfaya: these got the worst abandoned farms, 
they had to equip them with mattresses brought from the village 
on top of a couple of animals, and they accepted almost any 
salary offered by the large landowners who then controlled most 
of Andalusia's land. In the late 80s small landowners in Alfaya, 
who had struggled for afair salary in the past, generally respected 
the minimum legal salary, and paid equally to al1 dayworkers, 
Andalusians or Africans. However, Alfaya's peasants resisted to 
provide good housing to dayworkers, even if accepting this was 
a worker's right, by claiming they still were poor peasants, strongly 
indebted, and thus unable to make the investments required to 
adapt old littlefarms into worker's houses. The problem of housing, 
together with legal status of foreigners, are in fact key 
discriminations in the construction of the problem of immigration 
as an ethnic conflict, as I will show below. In the late 80s, when 
African immigrants started working in intensive horticulture, the 
fact that most immigrants were considered as <<¡Ilegal), by the 
LOE was not considered a problem for hiring them. ln fact, almost 
half of the production and one third of labor hiring were not legal, 
that is, they were not registered as official transactions. In addition 
to the importance of informal economy, fraud in declaring the 
minimum journeyworks needed in order to receive the agricultural 
unemployment subsidy was, and still is, rampant. In contrast to 
Africans who depended totally on the salary received, like 
dayworkers twenty years ago, Andalusians were granted an 
unemployment compensation after declaring that they have only 
managed to work for 60-90 journeyworks a year (depending of 
their age). Thus, the <<illegality)> of foreign labor caused no moral 
problems to local peasants, who were aware of the <<illegality>) of 
other Andalusian S as well as their own irregular situation. Rather, 
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peasants defined a <<legal>) worker in terms of the quality of work 
and of personal honesty and responsibility (Suárez Navaz 1996a). 
From 1!391 this situation is gradually changing, as the first 
active immigration policy designed in the 1990 governmental 
document I refer to in the second section of this paper gets 
enforced. Tlie priorities set in this program where shaped by the 
project of a Europe without inner frontiers, and followed the 
guidelines of the Schengen Group, which stressed the need of 
strict control of frontiers, the establishment of visa for extra- 
communitarian countries, and persecution of <<¡Ilegal>> immigrants 
established in the European territory. The new requirement of a 
visafor Moroccans and the regularization program offered by the 
government in 1991 attracted thousands of Africans who risked 
their lives and pledged their savings with the Mafiosi networks 
that flourished to cover the demand to cross the Strait of Gibral- 
tar. This phenomenon was broadly covered by the mass media, 
new NGOs were created to cover assistance to immigrants and 
to denounce immigrants terrible conditions of life and the effects 
of the enforcement of the LOE. In fact 1991 was the crucial year 
in the construction of the <<problem of immigration>> at the national 
level, and this process reverberated at the local level, shaping 
the way the struggle for immigrants rights was held in Alfaya. 
In the village, the c<immigration problem,, interwove with local 
political struggle for the space and the meaning of the left, either 
as a revolutionary, internationalist struggle or as a reformist, 
socialdemoivratic agenda.21 The defense of immigrants rights 
- 
21. Althoilgh it is impossible here to develop more historical analysis of the 
village itself, it iis important to stress thevery revolutionary process that took place 
here since the inid-70s. The people now in power belonged almost al1 of them to 
the workers' rnovement (PTE), a section of the Communist party that was absorbed 
by the Socialist arty (PSOE) in 1991. Other people related to the Communist party, 
not in power now, blarne their old comrades for having changed so dramatically 
their position. The interna1 political struggle in the town is one of the main topics 
of conversatiori, and many immigrants are very aware of this confrontation. 
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was not explicitly framed in a party politics discourse, but rather 
in a broader human and worker rights one. This time, contrary to 
Assane's case which was directed towards provincial and national 
authorities, claims were made directly to local authorities requiring 
them to recognize African immigrants rights as village S inhabitants 
and workers, no matter what their legal status was. The moral 
authority of the discourse of the leader of the shelter movement, 
drawing from emigration experience of most peasants in the 
village, the right of any worker unable to feed hislher family to 
cross borders and find a job abroad, and the catholic principle 
of charity with the poor, was very strong. Municipal authorities 
were trapped in the contradictory position of having to enforce 
legality (and specifically the LOE) at the local level and at the 
same time maintain the ideological principles which had brought 
them to power. They refused to officially support a shelter without 
al1 the legal requirements for such a use, specially when this 
shelter was going to lodge mostly <<¡Ilegal,, immigrants. In several 
public appearances and interviews, however, they always voiced 
their support of international migrant workers rights. A group of 
villagers and immigrants looked down this assertion as 
hypocritical, and despite the opposition of local government, they 
finally conditioned a agricultural warehouse into an immigrants 
shelter. The parish priest asked people to cooperate in the effort 
providing the shelter with mattresses, blankets, and kitchen tools. 
Many villagers gave what they could in the name of the leftist and 
catholic principle of solidarity with the disadvantaged, including 
people who were opposed to the official support of immigrants 
shelter. 
The establishment of an unofficial shelter in thevillage marked 
profoundly the way immigrants were perceived by most villagers 
as well as Africans construction of a collective identity and 
participation in the local public sphere. It helped to crystallize in 
several ways the stereotype of immigrants which was then 
dominant in mass media. First, spatial segmentation helped to 
create a homogeneous image of African immigrants as workers 
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(<different,, from the rest of temporary immigrants daily coming to 
the village. The concept immigrant came to be identified with that 
of <<moors,>, foreigners, and illegals. The Mayor actively helped 
to create this image, saying that <( ... we have to be careful with the 
ghetto effec:t and with the potential attraction of illegal immigrants 
who will not have possibilities to work here. Those of them who do 
not find a job must leave, because this village is not a refugee 
camp,, (interview, summer1992). Second, this symbolic space 
(<occupied,> by immigrants was perceived as threatening, 
unknown, aiid potentially polluter of the rest of the village spaces. 
The local press echoed the opinion that <<a shelter with no sanitary 
or hygienic condition ... may bring to the village drugs or sickness,, 
(El Ideal, July 11th 1991). Finally, immigrants were accused of 
claiming special privileges, like free housing, and of receiving 
more attention than <<normal,> citizens, even though most people 
recognized theirs was a very difficult situation. 
On the other hand, the effect on immigrant's identities, claims, 
and participation in the public sphere was also important. Even 
though running a shelter for almost 100 persons was a difficult 
experience, most participants agreed that the shelter did not only 
provide them with a space to sleep and eat, but also a symbolic 
space of ((autonomy and dignity,> where they could discuss their 
problems and <<a place from which immigrants can create a 
collective iclentity, a base for hope, and a motivation for struggle,, 
(Diario 16, July 28th, 1996). Immigrants' leaders, most of whom 
were going to create autonomous immigrants' associations, were 
trained in the almost daily meetings held in the shelter under the 
direction of the local leader. In those meetings they organized 
daily life and discussed collective answers to some racist attacks 
on the shell:er or to the effects of the strengthening of the enfor- 
cement of Alien Law both at the physical frontier and at the inland.'" 
22. The L-OE penalizes not only eillegal- foreigners and employers who hire 
them, but also any person who, though not directly hiring them, is helping them in 
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lmmigrants got involved in local political struggle and learned 
about the effectiveness of the discourse used to claim their rights 
as workers and human beings. At the same time, however, they 
also resented the political strategy imposed on them by the local 
NGO Ardo El-Jamia (Everybody S Land), based on a complete 
opposition to local council's ambiguous attitude towards im- 
migrants and on the use of newspapers to accuse municipal 
authorities of racism. Come immigrants leaders also learned to 
resist what they consider as a paternalistic and homogeneous 
representation of African immigrants as poor people from the 
Third World who lacked everything: (<We are not just people 
((without,, things or rights, we also have many rich traditions and 
important social resources lacked by Western societies. In order 
to show respect towards us it is important to know and stress this 
also.= (M. Moroccan immigrant). Even though racism and legal 
exclusion from human and international workers rights were felt 
by some leaders as the crucial issues to be fought about, 
immigrants already knew by the end of the summer how strongly 
people reacted to accusations of racism and to claims for a space 
in the village politics and daily life. 
In order to get cooperation to gather the documents needed 
for the 1991 -92 regularization campaign, immigrants and village 
supporters used the most effective discourse referred above, 
avoiding to mention discriminatory practices. Despite the 
reluctance of the local council to back an unofficial shelter which 
finding jobs. The leaderof theshelter was -punished>> that sumrnerfor his behavior 
with afine of $8,000 (average 9-months salary!). This case was published in El 
País, the main newspaper in Spain, and the information could be read as both an 
warning and a denounce of the LOE. When E. received the notification of the 
penalization, as he told me, immigrants talked about strategies to collect the 
rnoney for him. This solidarity should not be understood, according to E. as a 
<<utilitarian)> one, but as the real connection of interests between him and the 
imrnigrants and as a consequence of the common struggle against racism and 
social injustice. 
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challenged Alien Law S strict division between legal and <<illegal,, 
immigrants, severa1 councilors helped the networking efforts of 
the local leaider of the shelter movement to persuade each peasant 
to <<legalize,, oneor two Africans. They supported the regularization 
(<to avoid exploitation of African workers,,, but they refuse the 
((utopic,, struggle of the shelter leader to provide lodging to 
anybody who arrive to the village in search of work: <<We are a 
poor council, we cannot solve North African problems by 
ourselves. IEvery employer has to provide with lodging to people 
who work f l ~ r  him, that S a worker right, and so workers have to 
have [legal] tools to require this right.,, (my parenthesis-, interview 
with Mayor, summer 1992). 
In 199:3 when I arrived for the first time to the village the 
possibility of a new shelter was completely thrown away. The 
local council in agreement with and supported by the regional 
governmerit, changed its strategy by adopting an official program 
of assistance to immigrants, consisting mainly in: 1 )  a housing 
program fcr <(legal immigrants,, called <<Tutelary Housing Plan,, 
(Plan de Viviendas Tuteladas, PVT) aimed at persuading local 
owners of houses to rent them to African i m m i g r a n t ~ , ~ ~  and 2) 
Immigrants lnformation Office thought mainly as legal information 
and procedure of regularization and renewal of worklstay permits. 
Differences imposed by the strong Iine drawn by the LOE between 
legal/<<illegal~, immigrants and reproduced by the local council in 
the new irrimigration program, caused tensions within the ¡m- 
migrant cornmunity. The legal immigrants (los legales) had access 
to public benefits, get the minimum salary required for Spaniards, 
and can rivnt houses. Their living conditions are completely 
different from (<the illegals>, (los ilegales), who have no access to 
23. In this plan local owners were offered by the council a lowering of taxes, 
the guarantee of receiving the rents, special subsidies and loans to condition old 
houses, and an insurance against fire of damages in the houses. Despite al1 this 
benefits most people resisted to rent houses to imrnigrants, and most of them were 
offered by people related in a way or another to local council. 
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health care, receive sometimes half the minimum salary, and by 
law cannot form associations, or even rent houses. One of the 
<<veterans,, who had regularized his situation in 1991 and have 
had access to one of these PVT houses in 1992 told me: <<The 
difference between legal and illegal immigrants is very dangerous 
among us, because some people take advantage of it. If I have 
a house, my obligation is to lodge my people, hospitality is a 
religious principie, you know? There are no superior laws for us 
Muslims. But some people are ignoring this. The fact that you 
have papers doesn't allow you to receive money for lodging 
somebody in a worse situation, nor to threaten these poor people 
so you can use them for your own profit ...),. The situation this 
immigrant is denouncing here had become an important force in 
the distribution of power within immigrants communities; legal 
status became a resource that some leaders used to secure a 
loyal clientele. A well situated immigrant could, for instance, 
provide temporary work to undocumented colleagues retaining 
part of the salary for himself or ask money from them with the pro- 
mise of getting some <<papers,, through his contacts with Spa- 
niards. One of these leaders legitimated his control on the Moroc- 
can community in these terms: <<Most Moroccans are illiterate 
and ignorant peasants. We have to show them the right way to do 
things here. They cannot live as animals, they cannot accept 
anything Spaniards offer them. I have spent much money to feed 
them and to clothe them properly. Everybody knows I care for my 
people and they respect me as afather>) (A. Moroccan immigrant). 
Paralelly, and contrary to the expectations of NGOs, trade 
unions working in the lmmigrant lnformation Office, and local 
government, internally immigrants tended to emphasize the 
differences among themselves, not only in nationality, ethnicity, 
and race, but also in the particular way they understand and live 
their common religion, These differences as well as a 
24. Senegalese people are generally perceived among immigrants as having 
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high heterogeneity in class and urbanlrural backgrounds showed 
as important hindrances in the creation of a common space of 
struggle and a cornmon leadership. During 1992 immigrant spatial 
dispersion in thevalley surrounding thevillagefavored this process 
of internal structuration. Senegalese immigrants, for instance, 
gathered around two spots: one was a couple of camping tents 
under the chestnut trees and the other was around the hospitality 
of a legal Senegalese worker who was granted a house by his 
employer. Vloroccan immigrants followed a similar process of 
diversification, characterized, in contrast to Senegalese and as 
a reflection of Moroccan politics, by strong distrust among each 
other and a permanent suspicion of having <<spies>, in the com- 
munity (clandestine informers of Moroccan or Spanish police). 
This internal structuration shows the high heterogeneity and 
complexity of these new social actors in the Andalusian social 
structure. 111 spite of this, the imposition of racist descriptions of 
immigrants as an homogeneous group as well as institutional 
practices vvhich discriminate them as Third World foreigners, 
have shaped the construction of a new collective identity as African 
immigrants opposed to EuropeanIAndalusian citizens. But the 
awakening of ethnic consciousness, always <<a product of his- 
torical processes which structure relations of inequality,, is double- 
sided. Andalusian peasants also developed in this process a 
new colleciive identity where European ethnicity and citizenship 
a high degreeof solidarity aswell as independencefrom other groups. Moroccans 
are said to be more jealous of their intimacy, less solidary, and Algerians are 
considered by both groupsto bethe most aggressive and trouble-rnaking, because 
4hey know very well what their rights are>.. These cultural stereotypes do not 
respond to the high degree of heterogeneity I found in each of the groups. 
In relati011 to religious practices there are great discrepancies between North 
African and Senegalese. Even though lslam is generally considered as a multi- 
racial and multi-cultural community, in practice Arabs scorn black lslam and 
specially Muridism, an original Senegalese brotherhood which follows the teaching 
of an anti-colonialist black leader, Cbeick Amadou Bamba (see Su rez Navaz 
1996b). 
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becomes a <<dominant medium through which the social order is 
interpreted and navigated), (Comaroff, 1987: 308,311). The effect 
of the enforcement of SpanishIEuropean immigration policies on 
the rebordering of the Mediterranean, characterized by institutional 
racist control or persecution of Africans and legal exclusion, was 
in fact most successful when control was indirectly extended to 
peasants through lnspections of Labor. The contradictions of a 
semi-peripheral state in such a situation are served. While the 
informal economy and <<¡Ilegal), labor conditions are generally 
tolerated, specially in harvest time, the government has also the 
social responsibility for guaranteeing the socio-economic rights 
of Spaniards and legal foreign workers, and for preventing 
exploitation in the work place. This is why the state orders Ins- 
pections of Labor, in order to control, not only illegal immigration, 
but also autochthonous informal economy and fraud, defined as 
an <<anti-social plague,) (see Spanish Government:37). The 
analysis of the first major lnspection of Labor held in the village 
will illustrate how the process of ethnic and legal consciousness 
redefinition is taking place. 
This lnspection of Labor took place in Alfaya in September 
1992 and concentrated in the campground organized by the 
local NGOs to cover the housing needs of African workers, only 
insignificantly met by the official program of PVT. The municipal 
council agreed with NGOs and other institutions this campground 
was a temporary solution for lodging the more than one hundred 
immigrants then working in the harvesting. The intervention of 
officials from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, ex- 
ceptionally accompanied with several Civil Guards equipped with 
dogs as if they were to doing a criminal roundup, was a surprise 
for al1 of them. In this spectacular intervention, five immigrants 
were arrested, including one Moroccan who had al1 his papers in 
order, and one <<national,, employer was accused of hiring <<¡Ilegal), 
labor. The five immigrants were kept under arrest in Granada's 
police station, the legal one was sent back to Alfaya the next day 
and the other four were expelled from the country. The following 
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day immigrants and many villagers demonstrated in front of the 
municipal c:ouncil to protest against the <<racist,, character of the 
inspection. I interviewed several people in the village, including 
villagers and immigrants, thevillage's Major and some councilors. 
It was the first massive demonstration in the village related to 
immigrants vulnerability, and it was surprisingly heterogeneous: 
there where Moroccans and Senegalese, (both legal and 
<<¡Ilegal>,), ;and women and men of al1 ages from the village, 
volunteers from the local NGO, as well as several people from the 
municipal council. There were also significant absences, such as 
one well-kriown Moroccan leader who maintained a clientelist 
attitude both towards the local council and its compatriots. 
The dernonstration took place at the center of the village, just 
in front of tlie town hall, making for the first time a symbolically 
relevant spatial conquest. Africans showed themselves as a strong 
force, a group of racially discriminated people who knew what 
their rights as workers were. Interestingly enough, the protesters 
directed their criticisms against the provincial/national go- 
vernment, and took care that the municipal council, some of whose 
members participated in the demonstration, was not blamed for 
the inspection. The cautious attitude of the council and its ability 
to distance itself from the provincial and central government (in 
spite of sha.ring party affiliations), helped to create an space for 
immigrants where they could present a unified voice as migrant 
agricultural workers and against institutional racism. The Ins- 
pection produced a new collective solidarity among African 
immigrants incorporating for the first time al1 nationalities and 
legal statutes. Thefact that a legal immigrant was arrested served 
to strengthen the image of an arbitrary and racist state A new 
collective iclentity, <<made in Europe),, which stresses ethniclra- 
cial and legal discrimination acquires importance in the course of 
immigrants' participation in the public sphere. By the end of this 
summer the new independent immigrants' association, to whose 
first meetin!gs I was invited, emphasized the labor exploitation, 
legal discrirnination and institutional racism as the most important 
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issues around which immigrantsshould organize. Various reasons 
were given for this inter-ethnic association: (<We do not want to be 
perceived as Moroccans or Senegalese, because we al1 are here 
in the same situation. I think an association of immigrants should 
work for the legalization of workers, and against racism in hiring 
practices. We do not want our governments to label us as anti- 
regime, anti-Moroccans. We just struggle to improve our situation 
here and this should be very clear,, (J., one of the leaders of the 
association, working for a Spanish women under a legal contract). 
In fact, because of immigrant's appeal to their rights as 
workers, most people in the village supported the demonstration 
although they were highly concerned about the short-term 
consequences that may harm their interests. A lot of people thought 
this action was <<unfair>>: the Civil Guards had controlled the identity 
and required the papers of immigrants living in the camp and 
working in the lands, not asking anything from native ~ o r k e r s . ~ "  
Only one employer was ordered to show al1 the legal requirements 
for having three [African] workers with him. Many villagers 
solidarized with the peasant fined for hiring <<¡Ilegal>> workers: 
they argued the salary was fair, and that one immigrant can be 
legal but not necessarily a trustable, good worker, and conversely. 
By enforcing the LOE in avery strict way, the State was not thinking 
about peasants' needs. Besides, villagers' recent experience 
with emigration in Europe and a strong class identity result on a 
broad delegitimation of the hierarchization of legal statutes 
imposed on Spanish territory; as avillager told me ~there is nothing 
legal and illegal in working to feed your family, everybody has the 
right to eat. We did anything we could to achieve this in the north, 
25. The racist character of lnspections in the village have been proven in 
other interventions of the state forces, when they have insulted and run after 
villagers thinking they were. illegal moors>>. Moroccans and Andalusians, specially 
those who are working in the countryside, are very close phenotypically and they 
can be easily confused. In 1994 a young Alfayan was persecuted by the police 
while they shouted him .cyou stop shit moor>. (iparate, moro de mierda!). 
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and it is only normal that this people [African immigrants] do the 
same here,). Mostformer emigrants, however, did have acontract 
in Europe, and feel current African migrants are being deceived 
because a:; they say, Spain is not prepared to have immigration. 
Even though the state was blamed for the racist character of 
the interverition, many peasants thought immigrants were causing 
too much trouble. Some of them believed that this demonstration 
would foc~is too much attention on the village's informal hiring 
practices, and that it would mean the end of substantial profits. 
In fact institutional practices to control both illegal immigration 
and informal economy have produced aconstant fear in peasants, 
which was obviously more intense for immigrants. Peasants opt 
for being as invisible as they can, and because hiring an immigrant 
is to take a risk of being controlled by the Labor authorities, they 
have beco'me the most efficient agents of the LOE. They may 
recognizethat nobody can expel an honest worker, but they were 
unhappy about the way immigrants had used the word ((racism)), 
and their anger and fear easily transformed into ethnic 
confrontation. Afew people felt the inspection and the consequent 
expulsion of the workers was fair, because these (<¡Ilegal 
immigrants are taking our jobs away,,. Even though African 
immigrantc are not directly competing with native workers, the 
low salaries that a few immigrants accept in extreme situations 
are perceived as disloyal competition which, in the words of a 
local union leader, ((weakens the capability of class struggle 
against exploitation),. The ethniclracial segmentation was also 
seen as a hdoroccan or Senegalese problem inadequately brought 
to the village: <(they have problems in their countries, because 
they have irlictators that treat them as rubbish; here we know how 
is that like, but we struggle against social injustices in our own 
country; abroad you are nothing but a worker. In that sense we 
are al1 the same)). lnstitutional practices, thus, produce an 
ethnicization of class relations, with people in the same class 
competing for resources along ethnic lines. 
Along the years, the enforcement of the LOE has become 
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widely accepted. In a 1994 interview, a socialist councilor who 
had stayed in France for 15 years told me about immigration: <<At 
the time of the <<illegals,, demonstration in 1992, 1 was in charge. 
I talked to the Civil Guard, to the Governor in Granada ... l thought 
the council did not deserve a demonstration. Because we know 
about emigration, we know the difference between legal and 
<<¡Ilegal,, is not a persons difference [that is, it is an <<artificial,, 
difference, not a <<real>> one]. But we, as political authorities in 
charge, should be responsible, shouldn't we? And I think now the 
LOE is notan Spanish issue, is a European one. We are obliged, 
because we have problems with Africa, the same way Germany 
has problems with East Europe. We al1 have to cooperate.>> (A. 
former emigrant and councilor). In these years, people have 
become more aware of Spain's situation in Europe and its 
competitiveness with Morocco in some important agricultural and 
fishing issues. This argument was used in the village to <<keep 
moors under control,>, mixing it in a very interesting way with 
remnant historical imaginaries. An Andalusian dayworker who 
came from a neighbor province with his family told me: c.1 like 
moors, 1 have worked with them, and I know people do not treat 
them as they should. But you know?They have to adapt themselves 
to their situation, they are dayworkers, as I am. But I am Spanish, 
and you know Spain has a strong competitor in Morocco to export 
tomatoes and other things. It is fair that they work here now, I also 
was in Switzerland .. . .  The moors have a very special feeling with 
Andalusia, you know? Granada, or Cordoba, my own city, they 
dream about having it again. I thing it is fair they work here, but 
if they try to use Cordoba S mosque I will struggle, because it is 
ours. Wefoughtfor it, the same way we fought against dictatorship, 
and to change our economy, so we are now in Europe. And al1 this 
was not for Moroccans to harvest the fruits of our efforts,, (M. 
Dayworker in Alfaya). 
Peasants are thus incorporating (European) citizenship as 
an identity category which fuse together ethnic loyalties and 
membership rights and which depict Andalusians and Moroccans, 
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or Europeans and Africans as rivals. Similarly, the surveillance 
and control of immigrants activities as third world foreigners, is 
also being appropriated by African immigrants as an identity 
category arid as a form of resistance. One Senegalese expressed 
it clearly when he complained about immigrants who make 
distinctions among themselves along ethnic or legal lines: <<We 
are al1 brothers here!, al1 of us foreigners need the same papers, 
black, Arabs, Chinese, and whites. The state doesn't want any of 
us here, and if we persist is because we need it, al1 of us! > > .  The 
imposed need to present each year official documents (taxes, 
contracts, a permanent address, etc.) in order to work and stay 
as residents in the country is being transformed in a discourse 
which denounces the hypocrisy of the Spanish state in not ap- 
plying the same standard to Spanish citizens. Their enforced 
visibility is mostly felt discriminatory when they are required to 
pay the onerous monthly social security costs, given the fact that 
many Andailusian workers are not paying it: <<the Spanish state 
doesn't allc~w poor immigrants to stay; if you do not have money 
to pay, you don't get the papers,). This discourse, which is being 
appropriatird by immigrants' associations in Alfaya, is also 
indirectly resisting to the hierarchical model of citizenship that 
grants citiz~ens some rights denied to immigrants (denizens and 
undocumented, or following the popular Spanish slang, legal 
and <<illegal,>) on the exclusive base of place of origin. As some 
immigrants told me: <(Politics here in Andalusia are very much like 
in our coun~try [Morocco], many words and few real rights. The 
fact is, if you pay you get the papers; if tomatoes need to be 
picked the Civil Guard forgets about us. This is the underlining 
law, the reality of European society>) (R. Moroccan immigrant). 
Legality and legitimacy in citizenship discourses 
The material and symbolic creation of new spaces is not an 
unidirectiorial process. The new imagined Spain, as a modern 
and democratic European country, creates new expectations on 
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citizens as well as new [unwelcome] duties. The demagoguery of 
control conjured up by the LOE is embodied in social practices 
in a way which reinforces the idea of national and supranational 
interests to be safeguarded by Spanish citizens. Third World 
immigrants, because of their always pending legality, their poverty 
and purported criminality, come to be seen as threatening and 
unknown, an alteration of Spanish <<social arder,), and are pictured 
as irredeemable <<others>>, locked up in an immutable cultural 
identity, race, or level of development, which is not ~cours,,. This 
artificial dichotomy between <<us,, and the <<others,, is at the base 
of the creation of an hegemonic ~~common sense,, discourse that 
naturalizes the idea that modernization of Spanish society 
<qnecessarily implies>, both leaving behind the <<time>> of a lower 
level of development, and setting a national and transnational 
<<space,> from which underdeveloped societies are kept out. 
At the local level, however, the cultural and geographical 
border between immigrants and villagers enforced by the law is 
also experienced as the dominance of <<northern,> European 
imaginary which disempowers people's cultures and autonomy. 
The dominant discourse in politics and mass media is still centered 
in the need to transform deep <<social habits,, that inhibit and are 
at odds with the modern and developed European state and 
citizens. The existence of a pervasive underground economy 
and social security fraud in Alfaya is represented in the dominant 
discourse as a consequence of social habits unsuited to European 
standards, an <<anti-social,> plague. Alfaya's villagers situate 
themselves in the contradictory position of being watchmen of a 
limited and ordered citizenship which is at the same time legi- 
timizing the control and surveillance of their own socioeconomic 
and cultural practices. 
However, not every social actor buys the national xenophobic 
discourse, and some alternative notions of citizenship are being 
constructed through political and social practices. These social 
actors include, among others the NGOs, whose role in both first 
and third world societies is becoming increasingly important, 
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and immigrants' associations which appeal to (and thus create) 
a new ethnic identity in order to be able to represent the highly 
heterogeneous immigrant population. The formation of these 
alternative social movements has to be seen in the context of the 
crisis of the na t i on -~ ta te ,~~and  the istance between traditional 
channels of social and political participation and the people, 
who ask for a more encompassing notion of the meaning of 
citizenship. 
The restrictive concept of citizenship prevalent in the domi- 
nant discoi~rse is at odds with that of NGOs and immigrants' 
associations. Whereas in the official discourse citizenship is 
something that one «naturallp has (just for being a Spaniard), 
the notion of citizenship I perceived as emerging from these 
subaltern practices is that of something that one acquires. If 
the dominant discourse understands citizenship as the condition 
for having isome specific social rights, the subaltern discour- 
se understands it as a tool to produce those and new social 
rights, and as a byproduct of the struggle for international human 
rights. 
The political economy of Mediterranean rebordering has 
arisen within the context of international economic dependency 
and rests on the interna1 contradiction of the nation-state, which 
is producing new ways to overcorne the traditional separation 
between states as the basis for socioeconomic development and 
the acquisition of civil rights and duties. Transnational population 
movements, based on historical exchanges and geographical as 
well as cultural closeness, cross these borders and thereby 
challenge their existence. The construction of new social actors 
in the Mecliterranean social space involve a break with the 
ideologically constructed boundaries between ethnic identities 
and cultural distances. New social rights are advocated from an 
26. See Istavenhagen, 1990; Richrnond, 1988; Balibar, 1991 ; Castles, 1989 
and others. 
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international and holistic notion of human rights, which questions 
the legitimacy of the rebordering of geographical frontiers, as 
well as a <<national>> common interest which requires ccus>> to 
support an unequal international distribution of power. 
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RESUMEN 
Cuando se estudia el fenómeno de la inmigración, es corriente 
centrar el análisis en las nuevas poblaciones extranjeras y asu- 
mir una <<diferencia cultural,, primordial entre grupos nacionales 
y extranjeros. Esta perspectiva ha sido corriente en los estudios 
migratorios realizados desde Europa occidental y Estados Uni- 
dos, dando por hecho que esa <<diferencia>, de los inmigrantes 
era ajena a una identidad europealnacional consolidada y a una 
cultura legal basada en la noción de ciudadanía. En este artículo 
cuestiono esta tendencia a asumir la <<cultura,> entre nacionales 
y extranjeros como eje semi-autónomo de la creación de la <<di- 
ferencia,, y la cultura legal de los nacionales como algo dado. 
Desde la periferia de la nueva <<comunidad imaginada,, europea, 
la actual relevancia de los ejes legales y culturales como marca- 
dores de la <<diferencia>, se analizan como resultados de un pro- 
ceso histórico de redefinición de la hegemonía dominante que 
afectan de forma determinante la construcción de identidad en 
los autóctonos así como en los recién llegados. La construcción 
de nuevas fronteras en el Mediterráneo en el marco de la crea- 
ción de la UE es analizada desde la experiencia histórica de los 
campesinos andaluces y su reposicionamiento en la estructura 
social, haciendo énfasis en el modo en que estas nuevas cate- 
gorías adquieren sentido a nivel local, y mostrando el efecto de 
la nueva cultura legal en la constitución de la <<diferencia,, (como 
clase o religión) en la forma en que se da sentido a las nuevas 
categorías legales asumidas de forma errónea como -atributos>> 
primordiales de los actores sociales. 
ABSTRACT 
Mediterranean inmigration into Western Europe has captured the 
attention of many social scientist intersted in the way inter-ethnic 
relations and conflicts are becoming a central feature of 
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contemporary industrial societies. However, most studies 
assumed fixed national, cultural and socioeconomic boundaries 
in the analysis of social changes brought about by migration. I 
propose to study inter-ethnic relations and notions of identity 
and differericefrom the strategic vantage point of Andausia wich, 
like other southern European regions that joined the EC in the 
1980s, has experienced a political and economic shift that is 
bringing about a redefinition of the symbolic spaces by which the 
notions of community and belinging are represented. the aim of 
this research is to understand the process by which new legal 
and cultura.l categories become <(a dominan medium through 
which the social order is interpreted and navigated,,, looking at 
the social process through which citizenship and ethnicity are 
legitimated and acted upon in Andalusia in the context of these 
major historical transformations. The case of Granada will enable 
me to question essentialist notions of social and cultural identity 
implicitly held in other studies, bringing to the center of analysis 
non-core E~iropean people's responses to Norh-African migration. 
